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Abstract 
This study employs the instrumental variable two-stage least squares 
regression approach for the data for 121 countries to explore the impact 
of a country’s political environment on its level of corruption. The study 
provides strong evidence that a higher degree of rule of law, press 
freedom, readiness and capacity to handle e-governance practices, and 
urbanization are associated with a lower level of public sector corruption 
across all 121 countries. The colonial dummies and having a presidential 
government are found to be valid instruments for rule of law in 
addressing the issue of endogeniety embedded in it. Further, to a certain 
degree, landlocked countries are relatively more corrupt than coastal 
countries. Finally, policy implications are discussed based on the findings 
of the study.   
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1. Introduction 
In general, public sector corruption means misusing entrusted authority or 
public office for private benefits or personal gains. Yet, the meaning of corruption is 
contextual and has been articulated in different nation state vernaculars accordingly. 
For instance, in Italian, corruption is called spintarella, which means ‘a little push’, 
in Greek, fakelaki, ‘a little envelope’, in French, pot-de-vin, ‘a glass of wine’, and in 
Spanish, mordida ‘a bite’. Likewise, in Slovak, corruption is called pod stolom, 
meaning ‘under the table’, in Korean, noemul, ‘giving goods in secret’, and in 
Japanese, kuroi kiri, ‘black mist’. Hence, the term corruption carries different 
meanings in different contexts with differing ways of application, however, sharing 
the commonality that corruption is a secret act of dishonesty for private interest.  
Senior (2006) defines corruption as an action to secretly provide a good or a service 
to a third party, so that he or she can influence certain actions, which benefit the 
corrupt, a third party, or both in which the corrupt agent has authority.  
Today, corruption is all too prevalent, not only in developing countries, but 
also in the EU (Senior, 2006). Corruption inflicts various adverse impacts on 
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economic, social, and political systems of a country.  Economists have clearly 
shown how economic growth of a country can be adversely affected by corruption: 
corruption increases transaction costs and reduces incentives for investment, 
thereby leading to shrink the growth rate of an economy. It also affects income 
growth, particularly of the poor, redistributing wealth away from the poor to the 
better-off and employees of government. This gives rise to increased income 
inequality in a country (see Gupta et al., 1998; Fisman and Svensson, 2000; Senior, 
2006). Moreover, corruption imposes a negative impact on tax revenue of a country. 
As Ghura (1998) argues, an increase in the level of public sector corruption 
accompanies a lowering of the tax-revenue-GDP ratio. Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) 
computed that one-point increase in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is 
associated with 2.7 percentage point decline in tax-GDP ratio. Transparency 
international (2010) points out that public sector corruption erodes the tax revenue 
base in the long-run, corrodes the tax morality of taxpayers, and distorts tax 
structures, leading to increase the size of unofficial economy of countries. Public 
sector corruption can, therefore, cause critical damage to the smooth functioning of 
an economy.  
Further, as argued by Seligson (2002), corruption generates political costs. 
On the basis of 9,000 observations from four Latin American countries, Seligson 
(2002) contends that corruption erodes belief of participants in the political system 
and reduces interpersonal trust, questioning the legitimacy of the system. Apart 
from economic and political costs, corruption involves social and moral costs, 
meaning that social variables are negatively impacted by corruption. For instance, 
Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) computed negative impacts of corruption on social 
variables like life expectancy and school enrollment using data from 71 countries. 
In sum, as Senior (2006) points out, corruption can cause serious impediment to the 
development of a market economy and a free society.  
It should be noted that the studies on public sector corruption have become 
prominent at present due to the fact that corruption is widespread in all over the 
world. The Transparency International (2013) considered 177 countries for ranking 
based on their level of corruption, but more than two-third of those countries scored 
less than fifty (50). Also the studies on corruption provide useful facts to address the 
question of how governments are made effective. As emphasized by Uslaner 
(2009), public sector corruption leads to reduced-salaries for their employees, 
because corrupt-governments spend less money on their workforce. Ultimately, this 
results in low level of economic growth and ineffective governments in countries. 
Moreover, as argued by Fritzen et al. (2014), the overall quality of public sectors 
depends on higher level of social trust resulted from lower levels of corruption. 
Therefore, to ensure higher quality of public sectors with higher levels of social 
trust, governments need to combat corruption. The initial step in combating 
corruption in any context would be to identify its underlying determinants. 
Accordingly, this study uncovers such determinants depending on the most recent 
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data published by relevant institutions including, the Transparency International and 
the World Bank.    
Determinants of corruption are numerous and multifaceted, thus making 
any scientific study of it causes a difficult task. Yet, the rich literature available on 
the causes of corruption notes that economic, cultural, political, sociological, 
psychological, and geographical factors play a major role in determining the level of 
corruption, whereas Ata and Arvas (2011) considering the mean values of data for 
25 European countries during 2004 through 2007 have concluded that higher GDP 
per capita, lower inflation rates, and lower income disparity reduce the perception 
of corruption. However, they’ve found that corruption levels are not affected by 
rates of economic growth.  Several studies have pointed out that economic factors 
are more important than non-economic factors in reducing corruption. For instance, 
on the basis of 41 developing countries, Shabbir and Anwar (2007) emphasize that 
in order to curb corruption, governments need to focus on economic freedom, 
globalization, and distribution of income and wealth, while non-economic factors 
consisting of press-freedom, democracy, and people’s religious beliefs do not play a 
role in corruption. Conversely, some other studies have noted that social factors 
including population growth rate, literacy rate, and religious beliefs do play a role in 
deciding the level of public sector corruption. For instance, Akano et al. (2013), 
using vector error-correction models for Nigeria, have shown the role of population 
growth rate and literacy rate in determining corruption, while Treisman (2000) has 
found that people’s Protestant traditions are a significant determinant of curtailing 
corruption.  
Regarding political factors of corruption, Ali and Isse (2003) contend that 
higher judicial efficiency and smaller governments are associated with lower levels 
of corruption in countries. However, Kotera et al. (2010) argue that the size of 
government does not matter in determining the level of corruption as long as the 
level of democracy remains sufficiently high. Therefore, as a part of democracy, 
rule of law has a bigger role to play in achieving lower levels of corruption (Salih, 
2013). Using a non-linear model to show the democracy-corruption link, Sung 
(2004) has clearly proven the fact that democratic accomplishments reduce the 
degree of political corruption in a country. Also, some studies have used 
instrumental variable regressions to consistently show the link between fiscal 
decentralization and degree of corruption, arguing that fiscal decentralization in 
public expenditure and taxation leads to reduced corruption levels (for instance see 
Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Altunbas and Thornton, 2012). Conversely, Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2007) have found no evidence to support fiscal decentralization as a 
determinant of political corruption. 
Finally, studies have tested technology-related variables to see if there is 
any link between corruption and technology. For instance, Pathak et al. (2009) 
presenting a Fijian case have emphasized that IT-based service delivery processes 
contribute to curbing public sector corruption. Also, Murillo (2013) using six-year 
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panel data for 208 countries has shown that using the Internet and government web 
portals reduces the negative perceptions towards public sector corruption.  
Within this context, this study is primarily aimed at analyzing the role of 
political environment in determining the level of public sector corruption in 121 
countries, both developed and developing. The ‘traditional elements’ of political 
environment, i.e., the elements that have been tested in previous studies, comprise 
rule of law, press freedom, nature of legislature, being a federal or unitary state, size 
of government, and openness of markets. In addition to testing these traditional 
elements,  more importantly, this study will be examining the role of e-governance 
practices and military involvement in politics, two ‘potential elements’ of political 
environment that have not been tested before, in curbing corruption. Also, in this 
study, we have used several control variables, namely GDP per-capita, Gini index, 
and religious beliefs, three variables that have been previously used though, and the 
rate of urbanization and being a landlocked country, two potential control variables  
that have not been used in previous studies and thus unique to this study.  
Corroborating the findings of previous research, our analyses show that 
ensuring rule of law and press freedom reduces public sector corruption 
significantly. Yet, more importantly, our study shows that e-governance practices 
can play a significant role in reducing public sector corruption, thus enriching the 
existing body of knowledge. Based on the estimates of control variables, it was 
found that countries with higher urbanization rates are less corrupt and vice versa. 
Further, to a certain degree this study proves that landlocked countries are more 
corrupt than coastal countries. Since this study is based on 121 countries consisting 
of both developed and developing countries, the findings are generalized to both 
contexts, the developed and developing. The rest of the paper is organized in the 
order that section two elaborates research methodology employed to realize the set 
objectives, while section three is devoted to elaborate the data and their summary 
statistics. The empirical results and main findings are discussed in section four, 
while section five concludes the study together with policy implications.      
       
2. Research Methods 
We consider the level of public sector corruption of a country as a function 
of its political environment. In this study, “public sector corruption” is defined as 
abusing of entrusted power by low-and middle-level public officials when they 
interact with the citizenry. Also the term “public sector” covers the central 
governments of countries and their decentralized-units that utilize public funds to 
provide services with the objective of enhancing social welfare. Also, the act of 
abusing of entrusted power includes a variety of misconducts ranging from grand 
corruption to the misconducts in procurement procedures in public sector 
organizations. As noted above, a wide range of variables are taken into account to 
capture the impact of political environment on corruption including rule of law, 
nature of legislature, being a federal or unitary state, press freedom, size of 
government, openness of markets, readiness for e-governance practices, and 
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military in politics. The impact of the factors external to the political environment is 
controlled by including an array of variables in estimating the model. They include 
a country’s main religion, being a landlocked country, urbanization, per capita 
GDP, and income distribution among people.  
 
Addressing Endogeniety  
Endogeniety might be an issue when using rule of law as an explanatory 
variable in the corruption equation due to reverse causation and measurement 
errors. Public sector corruption can become a serious issue threatening the rule of 
law of a country. According to the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe (2013), any form of corruption including ministers abusing 
their power, police officials taking bribes, elections being 'bought’, crooked judges, 
money laundering, parliamentarians claiming false expenses, and illegal lobbying 
weaken public institutions, undermining the rule law of the member states of the 
Council. Fedotov (2012) points out that rule of law cannot be established and 
ensured where bribery and corruption are prevalent due to the fact that public sector 
corruption shuns fair tendering and recruitment processes.  
Further, there are several pitfalls in measuring complex social phenomena, 
such as rule of law. Ginsburg (2011) notes that quantifying rule of law is 
challenging, resulting from the associated issues of conceptualization and 
measurement. Regarding the concepts of social sciences, it is relatively more 
difficult to formulate a concept by allowing a certain degree of abstraction. Put 
differently, in formulating social science concepts, the formulator should be clear 
enough as to what is being measured. Finally, poor conceptualization leads to bad 
quantification with measurement errors. This study uses World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicators’ Rule of Law Index, which is, however, subject to the same 
weakness discussed above. Ginsburg (2011) contends that this index aggregates too 
many discrete elements into a single concept. In computing the rule of law index, 
the World Bank has included the procedural elements as well as the substantive 
concepts, whereas procedural elements are related to the process of contract 
enforcement, the police and the courts, while substantive concepts are security of 
individuals and freedom from crime. These two categories of elements may not be 
combined together to formulate a single index. 
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 Therefore, in this study, the issue of endogeniety has been addressed using 
instrumental variables (IVs), and we use instrumental variable two-stage least 
squares (IV-2SLS) approach to estimate the coefficients. As instrumental variables, 
we use three dummy variables that indicate whether a country was a British colony 
or a Spanish colony and currently a presidential democracy. There is likelihood that 
these three variables are indirectly related to the level of public sector corruption 
through rule of law. Thus, the main regression model that we are interested in is as 
follows: 
 
 
 
However, rule of law that is included in the vector of political environment 
is estimated by employing the dummy variables for former British colony, Spanish 
colony, and current presidential government as instruments to address the issue of 
endogeniety.  As literature contends, colonial history affects the level of rule of law 
in a country (for instance see La Porta et al., 1998; Licht et al., 2003; and Croix and 
Delevallade, 2011). Cameron et al. (2006) argue that the problems of presidential 
governments are associated with rule of law. They clearly prove that the rule of law 
is weak in most presidential democracies when compared with parliamentary 
governments. Therefore, the predicted values of the variable “rule of law” 
(
^
__ lawofRule ) is calculated depending on the following equation: 
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The predicted values of the variable “Rule of Law” is included in the 
equation (1) as a component of political environment.  Also, i and i are structural 
error terms of the equation (1) and (2), respectively.  
The results of the test for over-identifying restrictions and the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test for endogeniety are reported in the last four rows of Table 03. The 
Wooldridge’s score tests of over-identifying restrictions are not statistically 
significant even at 10 per cent error level across three models estimated using 
different corruption indices as the dependent variable. Thus, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. It further says the instrumental 
variables: two colonial dummies and presidential government dummy are correlated 
with the rule of law and uncorrelated with the structural error term. Having ensured 
that the instrumental variables are satisfactory, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is 
conducted to check the endogeniety of the variable, rule of law.  The null 
hypothesis that the regressors are exogenous is rejected at one per cent error level 
for the second model, where the dependent variable is World Governance 
 
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Indicators-Corruption Index (WGI) and 10 per cent error level for the first and the 
third models, where the dependent variables are Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
and International Country Risk Guide-Corruption Index (ICRG), respectively. 
Therefore, it is clear that the rule of law is an endogenous regressor and that we 
need to employ instrumental variable approach instead of OLS approach. 
 
Robustness Check 
     In order to secure robustness of the findings, OLS and IV-2SLS models 
are estimated by using three different measurements of public sector corruption, 
namely CPI, WGI, and ICRG. The source and the range of each index are presented 
in Table 01.  
 
TABLE 01 
Alternative Indices for the Level of Public Sector Corruption 
Corruption Index Compiler Range 
Very 
Clean  
Highly 
Corrupt 
Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 
Transparency 
International, Berlin 
10 0 
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)-Corruption 
Index  
The Political Risk 
Services (PRS) Group, 
New York  
6 0 
The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI)-Corruption 
Control  
The World Bank, 
Washington D.C. 
2.5 -2.5 
 
Source: Transparency International, 2012, The PRS Group, 2012, The World Bank, 2012. 
  
These three corruption indices have been compiled by the Transparency 
International, the World Bank, and the Political Risk Services (PRS) group, 
respectively. Though their ranges are different, in all three indices, higher index 
values indicate lower levels of corruption and vice versa. This is a commonly 
accepted method of checking the robustness of the findings of corruption-related 
research (for instance see Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2007; 
Kotera et al., 2010).  
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3. Data and Summary Statistics 
Public Sector Corruption 
The data used are based on 2012 and as mentioned above, the number of 
countries is 121 (n=121). The study uses three indices to account for public sector 
corruption and the summary statistics of variables are provided in Table 02. 
Accordingly, based on CPI and ICRG, North Korea has been identified as 
the most corrupt, whereas based on WGI and ICRG, Libya has been ranked as the 
most corrupt in the world. On the other hand, according to all three indices, 
Denmark has been identified as the cleanest in the world. Finland, New Zealand, 
Norway, and Sweden are also among the cleanest countries. Figure 01 positions all 
121 countries on a CPI-ICRG plane.  
Figure 01 shows that as the cleanest countries, Denmark, New Zealand, 
Finland, Sweden, and Norway are well above the mean index values, while North 
Korea, Libya, Zimbabwe, Haiti, and Venezuela as the most corrupt countries are far 
below the mean index values. Though Figure 01 generally depicts a positive 
correlation between CPI and ICRG, countries are rather sparsely scattered on the 
graph, showing a variation in the perception of corruption reflected by the two 
indices. For instance, Indonesia and Bangladesh are located above ICRG-average, 
but below CPI-average. Likewise, Lithuania, Costa-Rica, Turkey, and Czech 
Republic are located above mean-CPI scores, but below mean-ICRG scores. 
 
Political Environment 
The data capturing the nature of each country’s legislature include first, 
whether the legislature is unicameral or bicameral and second, women’s 
participation in legislature. The data on whether it is a unicameral or bicameral state 
is recorded as a dummy variable by obtaining information from the World Fact 
Book by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States. Unicameral is 
a type of legislature with single house in the legislative council, while bicameral 
legislative council consists of two houses: lower house and upper house.  As Table 
02 illustrates, approximately 55.4 percent of the countries have unicameral 
legislatures. The data on women’s participation in legislature were from Inter-
Parliamentary Union (IPU), which is the international organization of parliaments. 
The IPU reports percentage figures of female members in legislature for each 
country. If the legislature is bicameral, women’s participation in both lower and 
upper houses is reported separately. However, this study uses women’s participation 
in legislature in each country as a whole. On average, in the selected 121 countries, 
19 percent of the members in the legislature are women, however, the percentage 
figures varying vastly across countries. In the legislative councils of Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia, there is no women’s representation, while Sweden records the highest 
women’s representation in legislature. Moreover, the data on whether a country is 
federal or unitary were also obtained from the CIA World Fact Book. Accordingly, 
of the sample, approximately 15 per cent of the countries are federal states.
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TABLE 02 
Summary Statistics 
   N     Mean          SD Minimum Maximum 
Corruption Indices 
CPI 121 46.347 19.852 8.000 [N. Korea] 90.000 [Denmark, 
Finland, New 
Zealand] 
WGI 121 0.067 1.051 -1.400 [Libya] 2.390 [Denmark] 
ICRG 121 2.665 1.224 1.000 [Haiti, N. Korea, 
Libya, Venezuela, 
Zimbabwe]   
5.500 [Denmark, 
Finland, New 
Zealand, Norway, 
Sweden] 
Political Environment 
Rule of law 121 0.085 1.000 -1.690 [Venezuela] 1.950 [Norway] 
Unicameral legislature 121 0.554 0.499 0  1  
Press freedom index (inv) 121 0.047 0.032 0.012 [N. Korea] 0.157 [Finland] 
E-government index 121 0.546 0.208 0.000 [Guinea, Libya] 0.913 [Netherlands] 
Limited government 121 67.943 17.168 2.500 [N. Korea] 92.700 [Paraguay] 
Open markets 121 62.529 16.025 0.000 [N. Korea] 90.000 [Hong Kong] 
      (Table 02 continued) 
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(Table 02 continued)       
Federal state 121 0.149 0.357 0  1  
Women in legislature 121 18.973 10.611 0.000 [Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia]  
44.699 [Sweden] 
Military in politics 121 4.050 1.563 0.000 [Haiti] 6.000 [OECD members, 
Costa-Rica, 
Namibia, Jamaica, 
Malta]  
Baseline Controls 
Urbanization rate 121 1.820 1.363 -0.500 [Lithuania] 6.200 [Burkina Faso] 
Landlocked dummy 121 0.165 0.373 0  1  
Gini index (inv) 121 0.027 0.006 0.016 [South Africa] 0.043 [Sweden] 
Log (Per capita income) 121 9.222 1.222 6.215 [Zimbabwe] 11.541 [Qatar] 
Major religion (Islam) 121 0.248 0.434 0  1  
Major religion (Christianity) 121 0.488 0.502 0  1  
Instrumental Variables for the Rule of Law 
Former British colony 121 0.273 0.447 0  1  
Former Spanish colony 121 0.149 0.358 0  1  
Presidential government 121 0.471 0.501 0  1  
 
Source: Own calculations 
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FIGURE 01 
The Level of Public Sector Corruption in the Selected Countries Based on CPI and ICRG, 2012 
 
              Source: Own calculations based on Transparency International, 2012 and the PRS Group, 2012. 
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The data on press freedom were obtained from the World Press Freedom 
Index annually published by Reporters without Borders, a consultancy non-profit 
organization of the UN and UNESCO. The World Press Freedom Index captures the 
level of freedom enjoyed by both media personnel and media organizations in each 
country. It also measures the extent to which the authorities work towards assuring 
freedom of information. The index ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 being the best 
possible score, while 100 being the worst possible. In order to make the direction of 
all study variables consistent and easier to interpret, we used inverse of the world 
press freedom index. Therefore, in this study higher values reflect relatively greater 
levels of press freedom and vice versa. As depicted in Table 02, North Korea and 
Finland were the extremes with North Korea enjoying the least press freedom, while 
Finland the highest press freedom.  
The E-Government Development Index is a composite indicator which 
measures the extent to which authorities are ready and capable enough in employing 
information and communication technology (ICT) in delivering public services. The 
data were obtained from the E-Government Development Survey, 2012 conducted 
by the UN. The index ranges from zero to one, where zero indicates the least 
readiness and capability towards e-government applications while one indicates the 
highest readiness and capability. On average, the countries recorded 0.55 on e-
government index, however, the index value varying across countries with a 
standard deviation of approximately 0.2. Guinea and Libya recorded the lowest 
readiness and capability in e-government practices while Netherlands the highest 
readiness and capability.   
The data on limited government and open markets are from 2012-Index of 
Economic Freedom published by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street 
Journal. These indices vary from zero to 100 with higher values signaling relatively 
stronger performance and vice versa. 
The data on limited government captures the extent to which individuals 
and businesses are free from government control in using their income and wealth 
for own ends, and the cost of excessive government in terms of public expenditure. 
Hence, the Limited Government Index is the arithmetic mean of the indices, Fiscal 
Freedom Index and Government Spending Index. In terms of limited government 
index, North Korea reported the lowest performance, while Paraguay the highest. 
The Open Market Index is calculated by taking the simple mean of the indices, 
Trade Freedom, Investment Freedom, and Financial Freedom Index. Trade freedom 
is an economy’s level of openness to international trade while investment freedom 
is the level of freedom to capitalize entrepreneurial opportunities.  Financial 
freedom is the level of openness, transparency, accessibility, and fairness of a 
country’s financial system. In terms of open market index, North Korea and Hong 
Kong reported the lowest and highest scores, respectively.   
The data on rule of law were obtained from the World Bank. These data 
capture the level of confidence of agents in the rules of society, quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts. This index varies from -2.5 
 81 
 
 
 
to +2.5 with higher positive values indicating higher levels of government 
performance with regard to rule of law and vice versa. On the index, the countries 
scored 0.085 on average, however, with significant variations across countries with 
a standard deviation of one. However, Venezuela and Norway were the weakest and 
strongest in ensuring rule of law, respectively.  
Furthermore, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) by the Political 
Risk Service (PRS) provides data on military in politics as an index ranging from 
zero to six, where higher values reflect lower levels of political militarization of 
countries and vice versa. The average index value was 4.05. However, Haiti was 
recorded to be having the highest military intervention in politics while the OECD 
countries accounted for in the study sample together with Costa-Rica, Namibia, 
Jamaica, and Malta were recorded to be enjoying the least military intervention in 
politics.  
 
Baseline Controls and Instruments 
 As highlighted above, this study uses a wide range of control variables, 
including urbanization rate, being a landlocked country, Gini index, per capita 
income, and the major religion of the selected countries. It should be noted that data 
for all these variables are from CIA World Factbook. The urbanization rate 
measures the percentage change in a country’s urban population over a period of 
one year. On average, urban population is on the increase at a rate of 1.8 per cent. 
Burkina-Faso reported the highest urbanization rate in 2012. On the contrary, 
Lithuania recorded a decrease in the size of urban population being the country with 
the lowest rate of urbanization. Regarding income distribution, we use the inverse 
of Gini coefficient to account for the distribution of income among people. In 2012, 
South Africa and Sweden reported the highest and lowest income disparity, 
respectively. In terms of per capita income, Zimbabwe and Qatar reported the worst 
and best performance, respectively.  
In terms of instrumental variables, of the sample 27.3 per cent are former 
British colonies, 14.9 per cent are former Spanish colonies, while 47.1 per cent have 
presidential governments. Table 02 presents summary statistics for these 
instrumental variables.  
In case of using secondary data, it is important to consider two conditions 
when it comes to reliability and validity. First, any researcher needs to ensure that 
data cover population that the study needs to study. Since the study considers data 
from 121 countries, the findings would be reasonably representative of the 
population. Second, researchers need to have clear explanation of the process of 
collecting data. As explained priori, all data series used in this study are from 
widely recognized and accepted sources on which the majority of literature in this 
research area is based. The annual reports and official websites of the data sources 
comprehensively provide the mechanism adopted to collect data and also the 
methodology employed to quantify certain indices. Therefore, it can be ensured that 
the data series used for this study are both reliable and valid.   
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4. Empirical Results 
Rule of Law and Free Press 
Table 03 presents key results of the study: first, it shows OLS estimates for 
three regression equations with three different corruption indices for the dependent 
variable; and second, it reports IV-2SLS estimates. Since IV-2SLS estimates are 
more consistent than OLS estimates due to the issue of endogeniety, our 
interpretations are primarily based on IV-2SLS estimates.  
The coefficient of determination (R-squared value) is satisfactorily high 
across all the models. Referring to IV-2SLS models, for instance, the variation of 
the chosen explanatory variables explain 92.5 per cent of the variation of the level 
of corruption measured in terms of CPI. As indices of corruption, the values 
reported on WGI and ICRG are 92.4 and 87.3 per cent, respectively.    
According to Table 03, the coefficients for rule of law are statistically 
significant in both the OLS and IV-2SLS results confirming that a country’s rule of 
law is a main determinant of its public sector corruption. Further, the positive sign 
of the coefficients indicates that a higher degree of rule of law leads to higher 
corruption indices, thus signaling that higher performance in terms of rule of law 
leads to lower corruption levels in the countries. In other words, the countries whose 
agents are more confident in the rule of society, quality of contracts, property rights, 
the police, and courts are less corrupt and vice versa. Akano et al. (2013) argue that 
a country’s rule of law promoted by an independent judiciary and police services 
would build the confidence level of its citizenry in established institutions lowering 
the likelihood of public sector corruption. These findings of Akano et al. (2013) are 
consistent with those of Leite and Weidmann (1999), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and 
Ali and Isse (2003). Salih (2013) in his estimations uses rule of law as a proxy for 
the judiciary system and proves that a better judiciary system results in lower 
probability of perceived corruption. Likewise, using a dynamic general equilibrium 
model, Croix and Delavallade (2011) estimate that a weak legal system favours 
public sector corruption.  
Resultantly, it is evident that the link between rule of law and corruption is 
adequately documented. However, this study solves the issue of endogeneity 
associated with rule of law by employing suitable instrumental variables, namely 
the legal origin of countries and the fact that whether a country is having a 
presidential government functions properly.  
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TABLE 03 
Model Estimation Results 
               OLS Estimation              Instrumental Variable [2SLS] estimation 
CPI WGI ICRG CPI WGI ICRG 
Political Environment 
Rule of law 18.4113*** 
(1.3788) 
0.9801*** 
(0.0655) 
1.1516*** 
(0.1043) 
12.5671*** 
(3.6417) 
0.5538*** 
(0.1997) 
0.6987** 
(0.2944) 
Unicameral legislature 0.5176 
(1.0856) 
0.0129 
(0.0528) 
-0.0399 
(0.0916) 
-0.3173 
(1.3108) 
-0.0479 
(0.0726) 
-0.1046 
(0.1113) 
Press freedom index (inv) 93.7611*** 
(24.3246) 
4.8686*** 
(1.1132) 
6.3508*** 
(1.8267) 
122.8796*** 
(35.5009) 
6.9928*** 
(1.8223) 
8.6070*** 
(2.4966) 
E-government index 10.5265* 
(5.9096) 
0.5952** 
(0.2876) 
0.8862* 
(0.5098) 
15.4011** 
(6.9720) 
0.9508** 
(0.3961) 
1.2638** 
(0.6062) 
Limited government 0.0834 
(0.0541) 
0.0023 
(0.0024) 
0.0009 
(0.0040) 
0.0339 
(0.0616) 
-0.0012 
(0.0050) 
-0.0029 
(0.0046) 
Open markets -0.0407 
(0.0633) 
-0.0042 
(0.0030) 
-0.0067 
(0.0044) 
0.0797 
(0.0922) 
0.0046 
(0.0050) 
-0.0026 
(0.0074) 
Federal states 1.7765 
(1.5918) 
0.0408 
(0.0781) 
0.0712 
(0.1162) 
2.2303 
(1.6438) 
0.0739 
(0.0869) 
0.1063 
(0.1216) 
Women in Legislature 0.0327 
(0.0613) 
0.0019 
(0.0023) 
0.0049 
(0.0050) 
0.0320 
(0.0581) 
0.0020 
(0.0029) 
0.0048 
(0.0046) 
Military in politics -0.8888* 
(0.4576) 
-0.0635*** 
(0.0229) 
-0.0998** 
(0.0407) 
-0.2107 
(0.4986) 
-0.0140 
(0.0279) 
-0.0472 
(0.0485) 
       (Table 03 continued) 
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(Table 03 continued)       
Baseline Controls 
Urbanization rate 0.8087 
(0.6609) 
0.0421 
(0.0347) 
0.0772 
(0.0571) 
1.8322*** 
(0.6892) 
0.1168*** 
(0.0391) 
0.1565** 
(0.0698) 
Landlocked dummy -1.6136 
(1.8981) 
-0.0705 
(0.0851) 
-0.2745** 
(0.1214) 
-1.5441 
(1.8293) 
-0.0654 
(0.0839) 
-0.2692** 
(0.1173) 
Gini index (inv) -131.2268 
(119.7964) 
-8.0884 
(4.9889) 
4.7507 
(9.0631) 
-142.4855 
(124.0619) 
-8.9097 
(5.9604) 
3.8784 
(9.1776) 
Log (Per capita income) -0.1395 
(1.1054) 
0.0175 
(0.0487) 
-0.0953 
(0.0921) 
1.5525 
(1.4041) 
0.1409* 
(0.0755) 
0.0357 
(0.1303) 
Major religion (Islam) 0.5998 
(1.4026) 
0.0152 
(0.0735) 
0.0520 
(0.1513) 
-0.6106 
(1.6238) 
-0.0730 
(0.1004) 
-0.0417 
(0.1751) 
Major religion (Christianity) -0.0046 
(1.5885) 
0.0119 
(0.0713) 
0.0265 
(0.1246) 
-1.9140 
(1.7713) 
-0.1273 
(0.0981) 
-0.1214 
(0.1645) 
Constant 37.3704*** 
(10.0124) 
-0.2813 
(0.4837) 
3.0915*** 
(0.7468) 
11.3989 
(16.1085) 
-2.1759** 
(0.8877) 
1.0791 
(1.4526) 
Observations 121 121 121 121 121 121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.937 0.948 0.892 0.925 0.924 0.873 
 
Wooldridge’s test  statistics 
(P-value) 
   1.7467 
(0.4175) 
1.6600 
(0.4360) 
1.2700 
(0.5299) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test  
(P-value) 
   3.5538 
(0.0594) 
7.5023 
(0.0062) 
3.3554 
(0.0670) 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. Also, ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
error levels, respectively.  
Source: Own calculations. 
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The coefficients for press freedom are statistically significant and positive 
even at one per cent error level. This clearly indicates that greater freedom of the 
press is associated with less public sector corruption. This finding is robust across 
all six models and also consistent with the findings of many studies (for instance see 
Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Shen and Williamson, 2005; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 
2007; Chaudhry and Glulam, 2007; Altunbas and Thornton, 2012).  
 
E-Governance 
In the context of contemporary public sector, ICT plays a significant role in 
delivering a country’s public services to its citizenry. Basically, the objective of the 
ICT based service system - a core of e-governance - is to integrate economic, social, 
and environmental goals through an institutional inter-linkage, where e-governance 
initiatives are expected to bring about greater efficiency, better service delivery, and 
higher level of citizen participation. Presenting a case of Fiji, Pathak et al. (2009) 
show that ICT-enabled service delivery can effectively curb public sector 
corruption. According to their calculations, the correlation coefficient between IT 
initiatives and corruption reduction is +0.995, which is almost a positive perfect 
correlation. Further, drawing on data for 208 countries together with instrumental 
variable regressions, Murillo (2013) notes that web presence of the government 
reduces the perception of public sector corruption. As a result, Murillo recommends 
international assistance for web-based service delivery initiatives of the government 
sector.  
This paper’s main contribution to corruption literature is that we 
incorporate the whole idea of e-governance through “e-governance development 
index” used as an explanatory variable in the analyses. Online public service 
delivery is one of the key components of e-governance. However, the degree of 
online service delivery through means, such as national central portals, e-services 
portals and e-participation portals and the websites of ministries differ from country 
to country in terms of their features, content, and the level of services offered. 
Accordingly, without limiting to government web presence, the e-governance 
development index encompasses the nature of telecommunication infrastructure in 
terms of the variables, such as number of Internet users, mobile subscribers, fixed 
broadband facilities and so forth. Moreover, this index recognizes the importance of 
human capital in successfully implementing a system of e-governance in a country. 
Therefore, the e-governance index considers adult literacy rate and the combined 
primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio to account for human 
development.   
Our analyses clearly show that e-governance reduces the level of public 
sector corruption. As shown in Table 03, the coefficients for e-governance are 
positive and statistically significant across all six models. However, the results are 
stronger in IV- 2SLS models, which are also considered to be more consistent 
estimates. For instance, as Table 03 demonstrates, the coefficients are significant at 
five per cent error level in IV-2SLS estimates as well as 10 per cent error level in 
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the majority of OLS estimates. According to IV-2SLS results, one unit increase in 
e-governance development index will increase CPI by 15.4, WGI by 0.95, and 
ICRG by 1.26 units.       
 
Results reflected from Baseline Controls 
 The coefficients for the variable urbanization are statistically significant and 
positive across all three IV-2SLS models, being a robust determinant of corruption. 
According to the results, the countries with higher rates of urbanization are less 
corrupt. It is likely that with urbanization people become more and more aware of 
public sector corruption and its nature. Billger and Goel (2009) point out that the 
concentration of people in urban areas gives way for room for frequent interaction 
between potential rent-seekers and rent-payers. This connotes that in rural areas 
people are relatively less aware of and exposed to public sector institutions and 
service delivery processes and, therefore, more likely to be potential rent-payers. 
Similarly, using cross-country data for 100 countries, Goel and Nelson (2011) argue 
that a higher urbanization rate is more likely to reduce the level of public sector 
corruption, which this study also corroborates based on consistent IV-2SLS 
estimates for the selected 121 countries.  
 Moreover, as shown in Table 03, countries with higher per capita income 
levels are less corrupt in terms of WGI though per capita income is not a robust 
determinant of corruption. Literature documents that a higher GDP per capita leads 
to a lower degree of corruption perception (Kotera et al., 2010; Ata and Arvas, 
2011; Altunbas and Thornton, 2012; Salih, 2013). However, our results show that 
GDP per capita plays a relatively minor role in reducing the perception of public 
sector corruption. Furthermore, it was interesting to note that landlocked countries 
are more corrupt than coastal countries. Table 03 shows that the coefficient for 
“landlocked dummy” is negative and significant only when ICRG is used as the 
dependent variable. Generally, landlocked developing countries are less involved in 
international trade when compared with coastal countries due to longer 
transportation time to reach transit countries and complex local custom procedures 
and services (Africa Infrastructure Knowledge Program, 2011). This complexity is 
likely to result in higher levels of public sector corruption in these countries. Yet, 
being a landlocked country was not found a robust determinant of corruption 
because it does not generate a significant impact on corruption measured in terms of 
both CPI and WGI.  
It was also evident from our analyses that being a unicameral legislature 
and its rate of women’s participation, being a federal state, size of government, and 
the openness of markets do not have an impact on the perception of public sector 
corruption.  Finally, it was noted that the main religion of countries, military in 
politics, and income distribution were also not significant determinants of 
corruption in the public sector.  
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5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations        
 This study contributes to the existing body of corruption literature as it 
proposes suitable instrumental variables to evaluate the impact of rule of law on 
public sector corruption having recognized the issue of endogeniety. Accordingly, 
being a former British colony or a Spanish colony together with being a presidential 
government at present were found to be satisfactory IVs for rule of law. This study 
did find that rule of law and freedom of press as significant determinants of public 
sector corruption. Therefore, strengthening rule of law by building people’s 
confidence in the rule of society, improving quality of contracts, ensuring property 
rights, and making the police and courts independent is recommended as a key 
policy measure to curb corruption in public sector. It is also recommended that 
ensuring press freedom, as a policy measure, can successfully combat public sector 
corruption.  
 Further, the study found strong evidence to support the association between 
e-governance practices and the perception of public sector corruption. Therefore, 
we propose e-governance practices as effective policy tools for reducing corruption. 
Increasing the level of government web presence, promoting ICT-enabled public 
services, and improving related human capital can be listed as some of these policy 
measures. 
 Further, based on the finding that increased urbanization is accompanied by 
decreased public sector corruption, policies that promote urbanization can be 
suggested as indirect measures to fight corruption. Also, as the analyses show that 
landlocked countries are more corrupt, we propose that such countries need special 
attention when formulating global policies to combat public sector corruption.  
 By challenging traditional literature on corruption, we showed that being a 
unicameral legislature, women’s participation in legislature, being a federal state, 
size of public sector, openness of markets, military in politics, and the main religion 
of countries do not have significant impacts on corruption. Likewise, we do not 
prove that level of corruption is affected by income distribution measured in terms 
of Gini index. However, this study was based on cross-sectional data for 121 
countries for the year 2012. Therefore, it does not account for the dynamics of 
public sector corruption in countries. Future research is expected to employ more 
comprehensive panel data to account for the dynamics and structural changes in 
level of public sector corruption in countries.  
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